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Abstract 
One of the goals of the Marginal Ice Zones Ob-
servations and Processes Experiment (MIZOPEX) 
NASA Earth science mission was to show the opera-
tional capabilities of Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
(UAS) when deployed on challenging missions, in 
difficult environments. Given the extreme conditions 
of the Arctic environment where MIZOPEX meas-
urements were required, the mission opted to use a 
radar to provide a ground-based detect-and-avoid 
(GBDAA) capability as an alternate means of com-
pliance (AMOC) with the see-and-avoid federal avia-
tion regulation. This paper describes how GBDAA 
safety assurance was provided by interpreting and 
applying the guidelines in the national policy for 
UAS operational approval. In particular, we describe 
how we formulated the appropriate safety goals, de-
fined the processes and procedures for system safety, 
identified and assembled the relevant safety verifica-
tion evidence, and created an operational safety case 
in compliance with Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) requirements. To the best of our knowledge, 
the safety case, which was ultimately approved by the 
FAA, is the first successful example of non-military 
UAS operations using GBDAA in the U.S. National 
Airspace System (NAS), and, therefore, the first non-
military application of the safety case concept in this 
context. 
Introduction 
In 2010, the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) determined that expanding 
the utility of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) was 
critical for advancing the agency’s goals in Earth 
System Science. Towards this end, in part, and to 
better understand ocean and ice characteristics in the 
Pacific sector of the Arctic Ocean, in areas known as 
Marginal Ice Zones (MIZ), NASA’s Science Mission 
Directorate funded the Marginal Ice Zones Observa-
tions and Processes Experiment (MIZOPEX). The 
effort, which concluded in late 2013, contributed to 
NASA’s Earth science goals through measurements 
that are directly relevant to improving Earth system 
models, improving our understanding of fundamental 
phenomena, and characterizing the change in the key 
components of the Earth system. Besides its science 
objectives, one of the goals of MIZOPEX was to 
demonstrate the operational capabilities of UAS 
when deployed in harsh environments and when 
tasked with challenging mission profiles. For exam-
ple, the MIZOPEX required continuous observations 
of the ocean surface, subsurface and atmospheric 
conditions, extensive airborne mapping of large sur-
face areas over the Arctic Ocean, and repeated visita-
tions to locations over drifting ice packs.  
UAS operations in the NAS requires authoriza-
tion from the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA), through the issuance of a Certificate of Au-
thorization (COA), applicable to public entities such 
as NASA, or a Special Airworthiness Certificate 
(SAC), which applies to all other entities. The na-
tional policy document1, N8900.207 [1], which de-
tails the guidelines for operational approval also sets 
forth certain system and operational requirements 
that must be met before a COA/SAC can be issued. 
The observer requirement is one relevant example, 
where UAS operations conducted under visual flight 
rules (VFR) must use visual observers (VOs) that can 
be ground-based or airborne in dedicated chase air-
craft. The underlying rationale is to comply with the 
so-called see-and-avoid requirements of the Federal 
Aviation Regulations (FARs), i.e., 14 CFR Part 91, 
Subpart B, §91.111, §91.113, and §91.115. Effective-
ly, the role of a VO is to scan the area of UAS opera-
tions for potentially conflicting traffic, and to assist 
the pilot-in-command (PIC) with navigational aware-
ness, so as to avoid collision hazards [1].  
Due to the extreme nature of the weather condi-
tions and the location for MIZOPEX, the mission 
opted to use a ground-based air-defense radar, instead 
of surface-based or airborne VOs, to provide a detect-
                                                      
1  Now superseded by the new policy document N8900.227, 
which retains the elements of N8900.207 referenced in this paper.  
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20140017285 2019-08-31T15:07:25+00:00Z
and-avoid (DAA)2 capability to comply with the see-
and-avoid requirements of the FARs. The UAS oper-
ational approval guidance [1] requires that propo-
nents, i.e., applicants seeking approval of UAS opera-
tions, who intend to use an alternative means of com-
pliance (AMOC) submit a system safety case assur-
ing that the operations can be conducted safely.  
This paper describes our experience with the 
safety assurance of the MIZOPEX ground-based de-
tect-and-avoid (GBDAA) capability in support of 
obtaining approval to conduct UAS operations. In 
particular, we describe how we interpreted the guide-
lines outlined in the national policy and defined the 
processes for safety analysis. We also describe how 
we formulated the appropriate safety goals, identified 
and assembled the relevant safety verification evi-
dence, and documented the operational safety case in 
a format compliant with FAA recommendations, in 
particular Appendix D of N8900.207 [1]. To the best 
of our knowledge, our safety case (which was ulti-
mately approved by the FAA) is the first successful 
example of deploying GBDAA for civil UAS opera-
tions in the NAS, and, therefore, the first non-military 
application of the safety case concept in this context. 
Finally, based upon our previous work, we describe 
an alternative, but compatible safety case model. 
Background 
We describe, in brief, the MIZOPEX concept of 
operations (ConOps), the GBDAA system, and the 
corresponding safety assurance requirements that 
were to be met for obtaining operational approval.  
Concept of Operations
For the success of the MIZOPEX mission, mul-
tiple UAS, i.e., NASA’s Sensor Integrated Environ-
ment Remote Research Aircraft (SIERRA) UAS and 
the University of Alaska Fairbanks’ Insitu ScanEagle 
UAS, were required to be operated with different sci-
ence instrumentation payloads over the relevant MIZ 
in the Arctic ocean.  Consequently, each UAS was 
required to safely transit, multiple times3, through the 
portion of the NAS between the base of operations 
                                                      
2 At the time, the terminology used referred to a sense-and-avoid 
(SAA) capability, which has been updated in this paper to the 
currently used terminology, i.e., detect-and-avoid (DAA). 
3 The SIERRA UAS undertook two sorties per day, whereas the 
ScanEagle UAS undertook one sortie per day for the duration of 
the MIZOPEX mission.  
(i.e., from U.S. airspace over Oliktok point, Alaska) 
and the identified MIZ (located under international 
airspace).  
The inbound and outbound flights for both air-
craft occurred through a transit corridor (TC), locat-
ed in Class G and E airspaces. The TC (Figure 1(a))
began from Oliktok point at its southern end, where it 
also overlapped with a portion of the enclosing re-
stricted airspace R-2204, extended to 2,000 ft. in 
height from the surface, and was 1 nautical mile 
(NM) wide by 17 NM long. In particular, it extended 
16 NM into U.S. airspace, due north from Oliktok 
point, and an additional 1 NM into international air-
space (Figure 1(b)). The restricted airspace R-2204, 
together with the TC formed the operational volume 
of airspace for the mission.  
 
 
(a) 2-D airspace sectional showing the transit corridor 
extending due north from Oliktok point 
 
(b) 3-D visualization of the transit corridor overlapping the  
restricted airspace R-2204 at the southern end, and extending 
beyond U.S. airspace in the northern end 
Figure 1. MIZOPEX Transit Corridor  
The unmanned aircraft (UA) were to be 
launched after establishing that the airspace was all 
clear, i.e., no incursions were predicted to occur into 
the airspace covered by GBDAA surveillance, during 
UA transit. Only one UA was permitted to enter the 
TC at any give time. During outbound flight, the UAs 
were tasked to enter the TC at Oliktok point, and pro-
ceed to international airspace at their respective 
cruise speeds. Cruising altitude was weather depend-
ent for VFR flight, and ranged between 1,000 ft. and 
1,500 ft. mean sea level (MSL). After exiting the TC 
into international airspace, the UAs operated as State 
Aircraft under due regard rules for MIZOPEX data 
collection. Re-entry into the TC from the north and 
the subsequent inbound transit back to base also re-
quired a clear airspace, again established through 
surveillance using the GBDAA equipment (described 
next). After entry into the TC, were an incursion to 
be detected and predicted to intercept the TC, avoid-
ance procedures (described subsequently in this pa-
per) appropriate to the UA location (relative to the 
mid-point of the transit corridor) and heading (in-
bound or outbound), would be initiated to minimize 
the chance of a mid-air collision (MAC). Contingen-
cy procedures (also described subsequently) were 
also defined for off-nominal situations, such as loss 
of communication links, or loss of the GBDAA capa-
bility.  
MIZOPEX UAS operations were divided into 
nine phases: (1) preflight; (2) taxi and takeoff; (3) 
outbound entry into the TC; (4) transit through the 
TC; (5) outbound exit from the TC; (6) MIZOPEX 
measurement; (7) inbound entry into the TC; (8) in-
bound exit from the TC and landing; and (9) post-
flight. Of these, eight phases (i.e., phases 1 – 5, and 7 
– 9) concerned operations in the NAS and were in the 
scope of the required GBDAA safety case, whereas 
the safety of flight during phase 6 in international 
airspace was addressed through range safety, and was 
out of scope for this work.     
GBDAA System Description 
To ensure the safety of flight during transit, the 
GBDAA equipment, which was collocated with the 
UAS ground control stations (GCSs), consisted of an 
intermediate range, pulse Doppler, air-defense radar 
and a customized, dual-redundant, radar display sys-
tem (RDS). The radar, operating in the X-band, uti-
lized pencil-beam antenna technology over a detec-
tion range of approximately 40.5 NM, an elevation 
range from -10º to +55º, to provide 360º azimuth 
coverage at a scan rate of 2s, over a three dimension-
al hemispheric surveillance volume. The RDS pro-
cessed the positional data of airborne targets obtained 
from the radar, to provide the UA pilots with situa-
tional and navigational awareness. 
The radar system (i.e., the radar and the RDS) 
was the primary means to (a) monitor the airspace 
including and surrounding the TC up to an altitude of 
10,000 ft. MSL, and (b) detect potentially conflicting 
air traffic (i.e., manned, general aviation aircraft, or 
rotorcraft) sufficiently early, so as to determine how 
operations would commence, continue, and/or to in-
form decisions to initiate any avoidance maneuvers. 
Avoidance was to be accomplished through proce-
dural means, which included tasking the UAs to 
change altitude, heading and speed, as appropriate. In 
turn, the latter relied on the airworthiness of the UAS, 
in particular reliable communication links between 
the GCS and the air-vehicles.    
The GBDAA crew consisted of the Pilots-in-
command (PICs) and the GCS Operators (GSCOs) 
for the two UAs, a NASA Range Safety Officer, a 
NASA trained RDS operator, and a contracted radar 
operator. The primary responsibility for monitoring 
lay with the RDS operator, with defined procedures 
to call out airspace status to the PICs and GCSOs. 
However, owing to collocation of the RDS and the 
GCSs, the PICs and the GCSOs also had the ability to 
see the radar display independently, for decision sup-
port. The radar operator was responsible for address-
ing any technical issues with the radar.  
Requirements for Operational Approval 
As per our understanding of the national policy 
for UAS operational approval, N8900.207 [1], the 
(implicit) requirements for obtaining regulatory ap-
proval were concerned with providing assurance that 
(a) the GBDAA system would allow UAS operations 
in the TC to be conducted at an acceptable level of 
safety; and, additionally, (b) that this AMOC would 
maintain the existing level of safety for the other 
stakeholders of the affected airspace.  
Formally, the FAA requires that such assurance 
be supplied in the form of an acceptable system safe-
ty case, which outlines the associated hazards, risks, 
and risk mitigations. The national policy also speci-
fies the minimum information comprising a safety 
case, and Appendix D of the policy document de-
scribes (at a high-level) the expected content, togeth-
er with the FAA’s preferred format. In brief, the safe-
ty case expected is a type of safety risk management 
document that should address: details about the sys-
tem and environment, including existing procedures, 
operations, roles and responsibilities; the intended 
changes to the system, e.g., the introduction of new 
equipment; hazard and risk analyses (of the proposed 
changes) including details of the assumptions made, 
the criteria for categorizing hazards, the levels of ini-
tial and residual risk, hazard mitigations, risk treat-
ment and hazard tracking; details of safety risk man-
agement planning; UAS capabilities and airworthi-
ness information, etc. For more details on FAA safety 
case requirements, we refer the reader to [1]. In addi-
tion to submitting a safety case, the national policy 
contains other explicit requirements, e.g., concerning 
the COA process, UAS pilot qualifications, etc., 
which were also to be fulfilled for operational ap-
proval. The scope of our work was, primarily, the 
safety case for the GBDAA capability. 
Safety Assurance Approach 
As mentioned in the previous section, the main 
goal of the safety case, as per our interpretation of the 
national policy, was to show that UAS operations in 
the TC using GBDAA would pose an acceptable lev-
el of safety risk for the airspace under consideration. 
This required us to demonstrate that:  
• During nominal operations, the radar sys-
tem could reliably, and sufficiently early, 
detect/track intruder aircraft predicted to 
intercept the TC, so as to permit the PICs 
or GCSOs to initiate the appropriate pro-
cedures and/or avoidance maneuvers to 
ensure the continued safety of flight during 
transit; additionally, under the assumptions 
made and given the performance limits of 
the UAS, avoidance maneuvers would re-
liably avoid the intruder aircraft; and  
• During both nominal and off-nominal op-
erations, there were procedures and con-
trols established to acceptably mitigate 
newly identified hazards to flight safety, 
i.e., any hazards introduced by the 
GBDAA capability were also appropriate-
ly mitigated.  
In short, the safety case relied upon assuring that  
GBDAA performed reliably, and that the hazards 
posed by using GBDAA instead of VOs, as well as 
any contingencies, were appropriately managed.  
Nominal Operations 
For assuring the safety of nominal operations, in 
particular UA flight through the TC, we considered 
the radar detection performance and defined avoid-
ance measures for each phase of operations, based 
upon the position and heading of the UA relative to 
the mid-point of the transit corridor, and the position, 
heading, and speed of the intruder aircraft. 
Detection Requirements 
The requirement for acceptable radar detection 
performance was that radar coverage would be suffi-
cient and that the radar could, indeed, detect and 
track intruder aircraft in its surveillance volume. For 
UA transit operations, the air traffic to be detected 
(and, potentially, to be avoided) was primarily non-
cooperative general aviation (GA) aircraft, rotorcraft, 
and tethered balloons.4 Cooperative air traffic, i.e., 
those aircraft equipped with a Mode 3/C transponder,  
was considered not to be a threat to safe operations, 
since such traffic is required to be provided with sep-
aration services from Air Traffic Control (ATC). Ad-
ditionally, air traffic detected above 10,000 ft. MSL 
were not considered to pose a safety risk, due to the 
relatively low altitude at which UAs would transit, 
i.e., no higher than the ceiling of the TC (2,000 ft. 
MSL). 
Sufficiency of Radar Surveillance Coverage 
The criterion for sufficiency of radar coverage  
was that the radar should able to detect an intruder 
aircraft traveling at a worst-case maximum speed 
such that, after detection, the time taken to complete 
an avoidance maneuver would be less than the time 
the intruder aircraft would take to intercept the TC. 
Our safety case showed that this criterion was ac-
ceptably met, by reasoning about the amount of over-
lap between the radar surveillance volume, and the 
threat volumes of the airspace surrounding the TC, as 
follows.  
                                                      
4 There are 6 private/public use airports and heliports in the vicin-
ity of Oliktok Airfield, which were considered to be the source of  
the majority of the air traffic expected to be encountered during 
MIZOPEX UAS operations. Additionally, the U.S. Department 
of Energy’s Atmospheric Radiation Measurement Climate Re-
search Facility operates tethered balloons at Oliktok airfield for 
scientific measurements. 
 
Figure 2. Surveillance and Threat Volumes  
The SIERRA and the ScanEagle UAs had a 
cruise speed of 57 NMPH and 48 NMPH respective-
ly, with each having a maximum speed of 80 NMPH. 
Accounting for headwind speeds up to 10 NMPH the 
maximum speed that each UA could attain is 70 
NMPH. In cruise, the ScanEagle would take about 
1200 s to transit the length of the TC in the NAS, i.e., 
16 NM, inbound or outbound. Thus, in cruise, the 
UAs were at most 600 s from exiting the transit cor-
ridor either by continuing if past the halfway point, or 
turning back if before the halfway point.  
However, at a speed of 70 NMPH, the flight 
time from the midpoint of the TC to either end is 
411.4 s. An additional 30 s was added to this time if 
the UA was required to make a 180º turn to return to 
base. Thus, an avoidance maneuver which would re-
quire the UA either to dash to one end of the TC from 
the mid-point, or make a turn and return to base, to 
avoid a potential MAC would require 441.4 s. This 
calculation assumed that the UAs would not be 
climbing or descending in the TC.  
We defined the threat volumes to transit opera-
tions as two overlapping cylinders centered at either 
end of the TC (Figure 2), with a height of 10,000 ft. 
MSL. The airspace was a combination of class G and 
E within the threat volumes. The radii of the cylin-
ders were determined from the time it would take an 
intruder aircraft to intercept the UA at either end of 
the transit corridor, if it was detected when the UA is 
near the midpoint of the corridor, i.e., 8 NM from 
either end.  
 
Figure 3. Radar Coverage of TC and Zenith Cone 
Although most non-cooperative aircraft in the 
airspace surrounding the TC were likely to have 
speeds less than 180 NMPH, we assumed a worst-
case maximum ground speed of 250 NMPH to pro-
vide a safety margin. Based on our analysis of local 
air traffic, we considered this to be a reasonable as-
sumption. At this speed, the distance travelled by an 
intruder aircraft in 441.4 s is 30.65 NM. We added an 
additional 1 NM as a margin of safety resulting in 
threat airspace volume radii of 31.65 NM.  
Since the radar was to be installed at the ground 
level, in its normal surveillance mode of 0º to +22º 
elevation range, the radar had sufficient coverage to 
monitor the entire TC into international airspace and 
could detect aircraft operating up through Class A 
airspace at its maximum detection range (Figure 3). 
To detect aircraft at altitudes up to 10,000 ft. MSL 
near the southern entrance of the TC, i.e., at Oliktok 
airfield, the radar was tilted to its maximum elevation 
of +55º.  
Note that radar surveillance completely covered 
the southern threat volume but did not fully cover the 
northern threat volume (see Figure 2). Additionally, 
the surveillance volume excluded the radar zenith 
cone (a.k.a. the radar cone of silence) directly above 
the radar, as shown in Figure 3. In this figure, the 
altitude of the restricted airspace R-2204 is 7,000 ft. 
MSL, and the intersection of 10,000 ft. altitude with 
the zenith cone results in a cone radius of 1.51 NM 
(shown as the circle projected to the surface). Thus, 
aircraft in these exclusion zones would not be detect-
ed in time to safely execute an avoidance maneuver. 
These conditions were identified and addressed in our 
hazard analysis (described subsequently in this sec-
tion).  
 
Figure 4. Waypoints at Oliktok 
 
Verification of Radar Coverage 
Flight tests were conducted at different altitudes 
in the range from 1,000 – 10,000 ft. MSL, with a 
manned GA aircraft, representative of the traffic ex-
pected to be encountered, to (i) characterize and con-
firm the detection/tracking range, (ii) verify that the 
radar actually performed according to our analysis of 
airspace coverage and manufacturer specifications, 
and (iii) identify shadows caused by any structural or 
geographic obstacles near the radar installation site.  
Consequent to these tests, the radar was located 
at the west end of the runway at Oliktok airfield, far 
enough away from the location of the hangar, to re-
duce the blockage of the radar signal. Additionally, 
flight testing established that in operation, the radar 
surveillance range was 33 NM (instead of the speci-
fied range of 40.5 NM), and that the strongest detec-
tion/tracking performance was shown for those tar-
gets which had a velocity component towards or 
away from the radar (perpendicular to the antenna). 
Since the radar surveillance volume was still large 
enough to cover the threat volumes, and because 
flight paths determined to represent a threat to transit 
operations would have a velocity component that the 
radar could detect/track, the radar was considered to 
provide sufficient detection coverage. 
Avoidance Procedures 
Due to the reduction in the surveillance range, as 
the flight tests showed, there was a shorter timeframe 
for the RDS operator to decide if a detected intruder 
aircraft would, in fact, intercept the TC. Therefore, 
the approach towards avoidance was primarily to re-
strict transit operations to the specific time windows 
when (i) no incursions into the threat volumes were 
detected after monitoring the airspace continually for 
a specified duration, and (ii) incursions were predict-
ed to be unlikely to occur subsequently. After con-
firming that the airspace is clear, the UAs were 
launched and tasked for waypoint-based flight where, 
effectively, after takeoff, the UA would proceed to 
pre-determined waypoints en-route. 
Altogether, 5 waypoints were defined: 3 at the 
southern end of the TC (Figure 4), and 2 at the north-
ern end (not shown in the paper). Two of those way-
points were also the loiter/lost-link orbit locations 
(e.g., waypoint 5 in Figure 4), i.e., locations where 
the UAs would standby in a holding pattern until ei-
ther the GCSOs could clear their flight to the next 
waypoint, or the autopilot determined a lost-link 
event. The loiter/lost-link orbit altitude was set to 
2,000 ft. MSL in the north, and at 400 ft. MSL in the 
south. For MIZOPEX UAS operations, waypoints 
could be thought of as locations at which UAs transi-
tioned from one flight phase to the next, and where a 
transition required an “all-clear” airspace status.  
For example, as shown in Figure 4, to transition 
from the loiter orbit at waypoint 5 (e.g., in the taxi 
and takeoff flight phase5) to enter the TC at waypoint 
1 (i.e., the outbound entry into the TC phase), the 
RDS operator was required to call out an “all-clear” 
status for the airspace, after which the GCSO would 
direct the UA to ascend from 400 ft. MSL to the 
cruising altitude. On the other hand, were an incur-
sion to be detected, the UA would continue in its 
holding pattern at waypoint 5 until such time as the 
RDS operator determined that the airspace was clear 
of hazards. The operating (and avoidance) procedures 
were identical for inbound entry into the TC, i.e., 
from the northern end, with the exception of the loiter 
waypoint and altitude (waypoint 2, at 2,000 ft. MSL), 
and entry into the TC requiring a descent to the cruis-
ing altitude.  
Upon detecting an intruder aircraft during the 
transit phase, the avoidance procedures to be invoked 
were dependent upon the position and heading of the 
UA relative to the mid-point of the TC, the speed, 
altitude and heading of the intruder aircraft, and the 
predicted location of intercept with the TC. In partic-
ular:  
                                                      
5 Waypoint numbers reflected identifiers rather than an order of 
locations during operations. Thus, waypoint 5, rather than way-
point 1, was the first waypoint after takeoff. 
(i) UA heading outbound: If the predicted loca-
tion of the intercept with the TC was in the forward 
path of the UA, then irrespective of whether the UA 
was in the northern or southern half of the TC, the 
avoidance maneuver was to turn around and return to 
waypoint 5, then enter the loiter orbit (see Figure 4), 
and await an all-clear airspace to resume outbound 
transit. If the predicted location of the intercept was 
behind the UA, when the UA was in either half of the 
TC, then no avoidance was required and the UA 
would continue outbound.  
(ii) UA in the southern half of the TC, heading 
inbound: If the predicted location of intercept with 
the TC was in the forward path of the UA, active 
avoidance was required, where the UA would contin-
ue inbound, but by descending in altitude and at its 
maximum ground speed. Although this maneuver 
presented a comparatively high residual risk, the ra-
tionale for its use is as follows: it was adjudged to be 
unlikely that the intruder aircraft would also descend. 
Additionally, the airspace analysis included safety 
margins in the estimation of the threat volume radius 
ensuring that, at the time the intruder aircraft inter-
cepts the TC, there would continue be lateral separa-
tion of at least 1 NM. For a predicted intercept with 
the TC at a location behind the UA, avoidance re-
quired accelerating to the maximum ground speed 
while continuing inbound.  
(iii) UA in the northern half of the TC heading 
inbound: If the intruder aircraft was predicted to in-
tercept the TC in the forward path of the UA, the UA 
would be tasked to turn around, return to the northern 
loiter/lost-link orbit (waypoint 2), and await an all-
clear airspace to resume inbound transit. For an inter-
cept with the TC predicted to occur behind the UA, 
the UA would continue inbound at its maximum 
ground speed. 
The preceding discussion addressed the mitiga-
tion of existing hazards, i.e., those that would have 
been mitigated using see-and-avoid. Next, we de-
scribe the identification and mitigation of hazards 
introduced by using GBDAA in lieu of VOs.  
GBDAA Hazard Analysis  
Process 
We performed a hazard analysis using the appli-
cable processes and methods (as recommended in [1], 
[2], [3]), to provide assurance that the hazards intro-
duced by the  GBDAA  capability  were  adequately  
 
Figure 5. Risk Matrix for Hazard Analysis 
identified and addressed through the appropriate mit-
igation/contingency measures. In particular, we used 
a combination of Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) 
[4], and Functional Hazard Analysis (FHA) [5] for 
hazard identification and to analyze safety risk. PHA 
was used to give a broad coverage of the potential 
hazards that may be encountered during (nominal and 
off-nominal) operations, while FHA is similar in 
format and intent, but orthogonal in scope. To focus 
the analysis, we also formulated a concept of GBDAA 
hazard, adapting the definition of hazard from [2].  
Specifically, a GBDAA hazard is a (known or 
unknown) state of the GBDAA system, (which may 
or may not be a deviation from its required opera-
tional state), one or more (known or unknown, credi-
ble, and worst-case) environmental conditions, and/or 
their combinations, which has the potential to result 
in an undesired event. The concept acknowledges 
that there may be unknown hazardous states or condi-
tions, and the challenge of safety analysis is to identi-
fy all the relevant hazards (i.e., as many as reasona-
bly possible), assess their risk, and reduce their risk 
to acceptable levels through hazard mitigation.  
For the purposes of hazard identification the 
GBDAA system included the radar, the RDS, the 
GCS and control links, the supporting power systems, 
as well as the crew operations. The environment was 
considered to be as everything that was not a part of 
the GBDAA system, i.e., the weather conditions, the 
operating location, and the air traffic in the opera-
tional airspace volume, etc. To identify and formulate 
hazards, we systematically traversed the GBDAA 
functions, and brainstormed about the environmental 
conditions.  
Table 1. Identified MIZOPEX GBDAA Hazards 
Hazard Risk Level Initial Residual 




Loss of the radar display system (RDS) to display air-traffic or cor-
rectly interpret radar signals High Medium 
Loss of command and control links High Medium 
A non-cooperative aircraft on an intercept course at high-speed, 
originating from the threat volume not covered by the surveillance 
volume, when the UA is in the transit corridor 
High Medium 
Intruder aircraft in the radar zenith cone prior to UAS operations High Medium 
 
Risk analysis involved the assignment of a like-
lihood and severity to the identified hazards in order 
to provide a risk level, i.e., a measure of the risk used 
to determine its acceptability. Figure 5 shows a clas-
sic risk matrix used to allocate the risk level of a haz-
ard. In our case, High Risk hazards were unaccepta-
ble, whereas Medium or Low Risk hazards were ac-
ceptable. Also, as seen in Figure 5, likelihood ranged 
from Frequent to Extremely Improbable, whereas 
severity ranged from Minimal to Catastrophic.  
The lack of operational data for GBDAA use in 
UAS operations in the specific airspace under con-
sideration, necessitated the use of qualitative defini-
tions for likelihood and severity, which we adopted 
from [2]. The main stakeholder that we considered 
for elaborating each severity class was the airspace 
user, since the focus was non-cooperative air traffic, 
with the operations occurring in Class G and E air-
spaces. For the same reason, ATC was not considered 
as a stakeholder in characterizing the severity classes. 
Assumptions 
A number of assumptions were made during 
hazard identification, some of which were previously 
made for the safety assurance of nominal operations, 
while some others were made to eliminate specific 
scenarios that could be normally hazardous but 
judged not to apply to the MIZOPEX operations.  
For example, cooperative air traffic and traffic in 
Class A airspace, was assumed to be managed and 
separated by ATC, and therefore not to pose a threat 
to operations. The worst-case ground speed for the air 
traffic expected to be encountered (i.e., non coopera-
tive) was assumed to be 250 NMPH. Cargo aircraft 
flights occurred between the airports near Oliktok, 
that were capable of flight at 250 NMPH (or greater) 
in Class E airspace, but were assumed to be unlikely 
to venture towards the TC based upon the history of 
their air routes taken. Additionally, it was assumed 
that intruder aircraft would maintain relatively con-
sistent ground speeds with no significant increases 
that could decrease their time of intercepting the 
transit corridor. Hazards arising from human factors 
were not considered in the analysis as they were as-
sumed to have been addressed through NASA crew 
training requirements. Additionally, UAS airworthi-
ness and the related hazards were not considered in 
the analysis, as they were assumed to have been ad-
dressed separately as part of the NASA processes for 
airworthiness, flight safety and flight readiness re-
views [6].  
Finally, flight hazards to UAS operations in in-
ternational airspace were not considered in the analy-
sis. As mentioned earlier, after exiting the TC into 
international airspace, the UAs operated as State air-
craft under due regard rules. Safety of these opera-
tions, together with the effects to the people on the 
ground, UAS crew and the UAS system were consid-
ered as part of Range Safety Analysis as per NASA 
procedural requirements [7]. 
Identified Hazards 
Based upon the concept of GBDAA hazard, as 
given earlier, we identified 5 classes of a combination 
of system states and environmental conditions that 
were hazardous (Table 1). Considered in conjunction 
with the eight operational phases and the UA heading 
(inbound/outbound), and eliminating those scenarios 
that were either precluded through nominal opera-
tions or determined not to pose risks, there were 26 
known (new) scenarios that had the potential to result 
in a MAC. Of these, two were worst-case scenarios:  
A. Loss of the radar system when the UA is 
heading inbound in the TC; and  
B. Detection of an intruder aircraft (travel-
ing at 250 NMPH, and predicted to inter-
cept the TC) at the surveillance volume 
boundary that intersects with the northern 
threat volume when the UA is in the TC.  
The determination of initial risk levels for loss 
of the radar and RDS was based upon their specifica-
tions of mean times between failure (MTBF), where-
as the likelihood of loss of the command and control 
links was estimated based upon previous operations 
of the SIERRA UAS. Air traffic density and other air 
traffic data, such as the average monthly traffic for 
the airspace surrounding Oliktok airfield was largely 
unavailable except for the data from the U.S. De-
partment of Transportation’s Bureau of Transport 
Statistics. While this was insufficient to obtain an 
accurate estimate of the likelihood of encountering 
air-traffic during transit operations, it was sufficient 
to provide an initial likelihood for the purposes of 
allocating a risk level to the relevant hazards.  
Hazard Mitigation 
Mitigations for the identified GBDAA hazards 
were largely procedural, and were implemented by 
the GBDAA crew, except for those initiated by the 
UA autopilot. Additional mitigation measures were 
also used that involved (a) the use of redundancy in 
some system components, (b) coordination and 
communication with the relevant airspace stakehold-
ers/users to improve deconfliction in the airspace dur-
ing transit operations, and (c) equipage onboard the 
UAs to enable their detection and tracking by ATC 
and by other aircraft. Altogether, the mitigation 
measures provided defense in depth.  
Procedures 
A variety of procedures were in place to assure 
that nominal operations would ensure safety during 
transit. For example, a daily flight “Go/No-Go” deci-
sion would be made after reviewing the weather and 
confirming that requirements for flight in VFR were 
met. In particular, operations in the TC required a 
visibility of approximately 2–3 NM and a 1,000 ft. 
ceiling. Additionally, it was also decided to conduct 
flight operations in visual meteorological conditions 
(VMC), to give manned GA aircraft the opportunity 
to see-and-avoid the UAs6. Similarly, all operations 
would only commence after verifying that the radar 
system is fully functional and operating normally. As 
mentioned earlier, only one UA would be cleared to 
fly through the TC at any time. Procedural mitiga-
tions for the identified hazards, and off-nominal op-
erational scenarios were integrated into the operating 
procedures, and the application of such procedural 
mitigations depended upon the phase of flight in 
which hazards occurred.  
For example, loss of the radar/RDS at any stage 
of outbound flight, excepting after exiting the TC into 
international airspace would either preclude UA op-
erations (in the pre-flight, and taxi and takeoff phas-
es), or would require the UA to turn around and re-
turn to base (in those phases where the UA was al-
ready airborne). If radar coverage were to be lost dur-
ing inbound flight⎯one of the two worst-case sce-
narios⎯the mitigation measure was to continue in-
bound at the commanded altitude and speed. Addi-
tionally, loss of radar surveillance required notifying 
the ATC, so that it could track the UA and alert any 
surrounding traffic. Loss of the radar system when 
the UAs were in international airspace was not a con-
cern as radar tracking would not be required at that 
point.  
Upon loss of the command and control links the 
hazard mitigation procedure in all flight phases was 
for the UA to (a) proceed to the loiter/lost-link way-
point, and orbit in a holding pattern until links were 
re-established; and additionally, (b) notify the ATC at 
Deadhorse and the air route traffic control center 
(ARTCC) at Anchorage of the lost link, and declare  
an emergency. For all flight phases, excepting for 
operations in international airspace, the loiter/lost-
link orbit/waypoint was at the southern end of the TC 
(waypoint 5, as shown in Figure 4). If command and 
control links were lost during MIZOPEX measure-
ment operations (in international airspace), the UA 
would proceed to the loiter/lost-link waypoint at the 
northern end of the TC (waypoint 2), and orbit in a 
holding pattern until either (a) links were re-
established, or (b) an on-board mission timer, typical-
ly set to 5 hours, expired. Upon occurrence of the 
latter, the UA would enter the TC, descend to its 
cruising altitude and proceed inbound to the southern 
                                                      
6 In the remote scenario that such an aircraft was not detected by 
the radar and all other mitigations also failed. 
loiter orbit (waypoint 5), and then autoland. The au-
topilot onboard the UAs were programmed to auto-
matically trigger these procedures upon loss of all 
control links.  
With multiple UAs in international airspace, 
there was a possibility that both could lose link and 
return to the loiter/lost-link orbit at the north end of 
the TC simultaneously. To preclude a MAC between 
the two UAs in this scenario, the flight paths of each 
UA was preset to be separated by 1 NM horizontally 
and by 500 ft. vertically. Furthermore, the mission 
timers for each UA were staggered by more than 20 
minutes to prevent both UAs from entering the TC 
simultaneously, upon expiry of the mission timers.  
An identified worst-case scenario was when the 
UA was in the TC (heading northbound or south-
bound), and a non-cooperative intruder aircraft was 
to be detected, traveling at high speed, predicted to 
intercept the TC, and originating from a location in 
the northern threat volume not covered by radar sur-
veillance, i.e., any location between NNE and NNW 
of the TC. The mitigation for this contingency re-
quired (a) increasing UA ground speed to its maxi-
mum speed and a dash to the nearest end of the TC, 
(b) active avoidance, including changes in heading, 
and altitude if there was a chance for the UA to be 
overtaken by the intruder. We note, however, that this 
worst case scenario was determined to be highly un-
likely to occur, since the intruder would have to orig-
inate from the portion of the threat volume in interna-
tional airspace and outside the air-defense identifica-
tion zone (ADIZ). As a matter of procedure, the 
threat aircraft would have been required to seek prior 
permission from ATC to enter U.S. airspace, at which 
point they would be alerted of MIZOPEX UAS oper-
ations and directed to alter their course.  
To mitigate the hazard posed by an aircraft in 
the zenith cone of the radar, VOs were to be utilized 
at Oliktok airfield prior to takeoff, to verify that no 
aircraft are operating in the zenith cone. 
Redundancy and Equipage 
In addition to procedural mitigations, redundan-
cy in some GBDAA components was utilized to min-
imize the likelihood of component loss, and thereby 
manage some of the causes of hazard occurrence. For 
instance, each UA had (triple) redundant command 
and control links: a 2.4 GHz radio control (RC) link 
or a backup 900 MHz link could be used to operate 
the aircraft from the GCS, or using a manual, hand-
held controller. Over the horizon control, (in interna-
tional airspace), was through an Iridium satellite 
communication (SATCOM) link, which served as a 
backup to the RC links. Additionally, the RDS and 
the power supply (to the radar, RDS and the GCS) 
were dually redundant to reduce the chance of loss of 
these components. To improve the ability of the ATC 
to detect the UAs and track them in flight, each UA 
was equipped with a Mode C altitude-encoding tran-
sponder. Communications with ATC involved the use 
of a mobile phone. 
Coordination and Communication  
Communication and coordination with airspace 
stakeholders is a key tool to avoid hazards arising 
from airspace conflicts and in planning for a decon-
flicted airspace [8]. As part of the safety assurance 
process, the MIZOPEX mission manager developed 
formal relationships with local airspace stakeholders, 
such as the ATC authority at Deadhorse, personnel 
from airports/heliports near Oliktok, and others7, ear-
ly during the planning phase of the mission, to inform 
them of the intended operations. During the mission, 
the mission manager also held daily preflight brief-
ings on the operations, and communicated status up-
dates. Communication with the stakeholders also in-
volved being updated of their intended changes in air 
traffic. A flight coordination procedures checklist 
was created specifying the required information co-
ordination actions and the crew members to whom 
the responsibilities were allocated.  
After finalizing the flight plans, stakeholders 
were notified of the area of operations by radio, e-
mail, and notices to airmen/mariners (NOTAMs and 
NOTMARs). After UA entry into the TC, the PICs 
were in contact with the ATC as required. Addition-
ally, periodic transmissions were made on the com-
mon traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) to alert near-
by aircraft of the location and altitude of the UAs 
during transit flights. Furthermore, airports near Olik-
tok that were equipped with automatic terminal in-
formation service (ATIS) capabilities included a 
warning about UAS operations in the TC and in the 
restricted airspace R-2204. Finally, an altitude reser-
vation (ALTRV) was coordinated with Anchorage 
ARTCC, to inform any Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) 
traffic of the location of UAS operations in the TC.  
                                                      
7 Such as air-taxis, and Oil & Gas companies that have airborne 
operations in the area. 
Discussion 
Safety Case Structure 
The safety case that we submitted to the FAA 
(as part of the COA process, and to meet the re-
quirements for obtaining operational approval) was a 
report in the preferred format specified by the FAA 
(see Appendix D in [1], for details). Abstractly, the 
structure of this report could be thought of as com-
prising the required core content and a safety man-
agement plan.  
Core Content 
The core content of the safety case contained the 
analysis described in the previous section. In sum-
mary, we provided a detailed description of: (i) the 
existing system; (ii) the proposed changes to the ex-
isting system, i.e., the introduction of the GBDAA 
capability, the concept of operations, analysis of the 
airspace, crew responsibilities, and procedures; (iii) 
the analysis and results of hazard identification, and 
risk assessment, along with the mitigations identified; 
and (iv) the assumptions made.  
Safety Management Plan 
The MIZOPEX safety management plan includ-
ed activities to monitor and track hazards (as well as 
air traffic). The data to be gathered included data ob-
tained from the flight tests verifying radar coverage, 
data obtained about air traffic (such as traffic volume, 
patterns, and transponder codes) in and around the 
TC during the course of the MIZOPEX mission. The 
intent of these activities was to validate/update the 
assumptions made and the understanding of the threat 
and surveillance volumes, to detect new hazards that 
may not have been considered in the initial safety 
analysis, and to update the safety case to be con-
sistent with actual operations and observations. Addi-
tionally, the safety management plan included an 
identification of the affected stakeholders and organi-
zations, and the steps taken to communicate infor-
mation about the UAS operations in the TC, so as to 
coordinate operations. 
An Alternative Model for Safety Cases 
Some of the authors of this paper (Denney and Pai) 
have previously worked on the creation of safety cas-
es in the context of UAS safety assurance [9], [10], 
[11]. The notion of a safety case used in their work is 
compatible with the FAA preferences for the content 
and format of a safety case, but organizes the infor-
mation in the form of structured arguments. This  
alternative notion of safety case has been put forth in 
other safety-critical domains [12] (where they are 
referred to, more generally, as assurance cases), as 
well as in aviation [13], and may utilize graphical 
notations such as the Goal Structuring Notation 
(GSN) [14]. 
Augmenting Safety Cases with Argumentation 
An argument is a connected series of proposi-
tions used in support of the truth of an overall propo-
sition. The latter is usually referred to as a claim8, 
whereas the former represents a chain of reasoning 
connecting the claim and the evidence. Applied to the 
domain of safety assurance, a safety argument com-
prises explicit safety claims, a chain of reasoning that 
develops those claims and the items of evidence to 
substantiate the claims made. In addition, a safety 
argument can typically contain the ways in which the 
stated safety goals will be developed and substantiat-
ed, the relevant context and assumptions, along with 
the justifications for their use.  
Safety cases can, then, be thought of as struc-
tured arguments that assimilate the body of evidence 
and the reasoning required to conclude9 that a system 
will be safe for a defined application and operating 
environment. Indeed, argument-based safety cases 
are intended to be explicit about safety goals, evi-
dence and the underlying reasoning. In contrast, we 
believe the focus of the safety case format in [1] is on 
presenting a compendium of evidence, and the rea-
soning that ties the evidence presented to the safety 
claims made may be (often) implicit. We emphasize 
that argumentation would augment and enhance, ra-
ther than replace, the present format preferred by the 
regulator. Additionally, we note that argumentation is 
suitable for the core content, and that safety cases 
represented as arguments would continue to require 
(and supply) a safety management plan to update the 
argument and keep it consistent with the system as 
actually operated.  
Graphical notations such as GSN (Figure 6) can 
be used to create argument structures, i.e., diagrams 
that explicitly document the elements and structure of 
an argument [14]. These largely serve as an index 
into the assimilated safety information with the latter 
being linked from the graphical elements.  
                                                      
8 Reflecting that which we would like to conclude.  
9 Or convince and communicate to the relevant stakeholders. 
 
Figure 6. GSN for Safety Argumentation 
In brief, as shown in Figure 6, GSN provides a 
graphical syntax of nodes and links to represent the 
main elements of a (safety) argument. The nodes are: 
goals (containing safety claims), strategies (describ-
ing how claims are developed), contexts, assump-
tions, justifications, and evidence (with their intuitive 
meanings). Nodes are linked through either a support 
relationship (the filled arrowhead link, meaning “is 
supported by”) or a contextual relationship (the hol-
low arrowhead link, meaning “in context of”). GSN 
also provides additional node annotations to indicate 
incompleteness (a diamond annotation, meaning “to 
be developed”), structuring mechanisms such as 
modules, which may contain other argument struc-
tures, and abstraction mechanisms such as patterns 
[15]. For more details on the notation, refer to [14].  
Application to MIZOPEX GBDAA  
Now, we briefly illustrate the use of structured 
argumentation by applying it to the GBDAA safety 
case. Figure 7 lays out a high-level argument struc-
ture for GBDAA safety assurance. Here, we stress 
that the safety case is not just the argument structure 
but also (not shown in the figure) all the relevant in-
formation linked from the nodes, and the safety man-
agement plan. 
The initial root claim (i.e., the goal node G1) is 
identical to the stated goal of our submitted safety 
case, i.e., that GBDAA for MIZOPEX (UAS) opera-
tions provides an acceptable level of safety during 
transit through the NAS. The claim is made in the 
context of the applicable regulations, the GBDAA 
system, the ConOps, the airspace for operations, and 
the characterization of the TC to clarify precisely 
what the claim means, and the conditions under 
which the claim should be interpreted. To show that 
this claim can be accepted, we can apply: (i) an ar-
gument of hazard mitigation, and (ii) an argument of 
compliance to the applicable regulations (represented 
using the strategy nodes S2 and S4, respectively). 
The former is further developed in a module address-
ing the compliance of DAA with the regulations 
(module node DAA), whereas the latter results in a 
sub-claim about the mitigation of all the identified 
hazards (goal node G3). In turn, this sub-claim is de-
veloped in separate modules, each addressing a class 
of hazards (i.e., the module nodes HazH1H2Mit, 
HazH3Mit, and HazH4Mit, respectively, in Figure 7).  
It is easy to see that this argument structure is 
similar to the structure that we used in this paper in 
discussing our approach to GBDAA safety assurance. 
We believe that such graphical argument structures 
would be intuitively easier to comprehend and, pos-
sibly, also to evaluate (although more research is re-
quired to substantiate this belief). More recently, we 
have supplied GSN arguments with formal semantics 
[15], making them more amenable to automated 
analysis, such as querying  [16], verification, trans-
formation, and report generation. We also believe 
that these capabilities will present substantial ad-
vantages during the creation, management and evalu-
ation of safety cases.  
Conclusion
One of the challenges in our efforts to create an 
acceptable safety case has been the nascent nature of 
the guidelines in the national policy for UAS opera-
tional approval as well as the absence of successful 
precedents (for civil UAS operations). There have 
been other contemporaneous examples of the use of 
radar as an AMOC in UAS operations primarily driv-
en by the U.S. Military. Our work was guided by a 
draft concept of employment (CONEMP) for ground-
based sense and avoid (GBSAA) operations being 
conducted by the U.S. Air Force at Cannon Air Force 
Base [17]. Later (after approval of our safety case), 
we became aware that the U.S. Navy was developing 
a safety case for a GBSAA concept for use at the 
Cherry Point Marine Corps Air Station concurrently 
with our efforts [18]. To the best of our knowledge, 
however, our safety case was the first successful ex-
ample of civil UAS operations with GBDAA in the 
NAS, authorized by the FAA. 
 
Figure 7. High-level GSN Argument (GBDAA) 
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